



Abstract: This chapter presents two ethical principles that 
are helpful in analyses of morally challenging situations at 
work. The principle of equality states that equal cases should 
be treated equally, and that a difference in treatment requires 
that we can identify a morally relevant difference. The 
principle is related to the Golden Rule, and to the consistency 
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. The principle of 
publicity states that the decision-maker should be willing to 
defend his or her decision face-to-face with relevant individuals 
and groups of people. In an organizational setting, this can 
include internal and external stakeholders like one’s colleagues, 
leaders, customers, and suppliers. This principle is related to 
the universality formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative, in 
that it invites a consideration of whether other rational agents 
would endorse the decision or judgement. From the outset, the 
two principles are neutral with regard to the tension between 
utilitarianism and duty ethics. Both traditions can acknowledge 
that different treatment requires the identification of a morally 
relevant difference, but will disagree about what constitutes 
such a difference. They can also acknowledge the transparency 
requirement inherent in the principle of publicity, but again 
part company when it comes to the applications of the principle.
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Clare is a professor at a business school. She recently bid farewell to a 
very talented MBA-student that she has supervised to an A degree. On 
the final day of term before Christmas, the student turned up at her 
office with a flat package wrapped in gift paper. He wanted to thank her 
for the excellent work she had done in supporting and supervising him 
during his studies. He was now heading back to his home country in the 
Middle East. From the size and shape of the package, Clare assumed that 
it contained chocolate, and had no hesitation in accepting it. Two weeks 
later, she has friends over for a Christmas party, and wants to share the 
chocolate with them. She unwraps the package and finds that what is 
beneath the gift paper is an iPad. What she had assumed to be a cheap 
and innocent chocolate gift was instead an expensive electronic device. 
She is devastated. What should she do now? Can she keep the iPad?
Clare’s initial moral intuition is that the answer is no. She needs to 
locate the student and return the iPad. This gift is too valuable to hold 
onto. Then she slows down and starts to engage in ethical analysis. She 
can consult utilitarianism and duty ethics, but their doctrines seem 
designed for grander situations, where more is at stake. To maximize 
utility with or without treating others as mere means is not the core issue 
in the situation Clare faces. What she needs is a set of simpler ethical 
principles. One place to start is with the formal principle of equality, an 
inheritance from Aristotle:
Equal cases should be treated equally. A difference in treatment requires that 
there is a morally relevant difference between the two cases.
When the student turned up at Clare’s office, she did not hesitate to 
accept the gift he handed her, since she assumed it was chocolate. Now 
the situation is different, but how might it be different in a morally 
relevant sense? The striking difference between a box of chocolate and an 
iPad is in the monetary value. Clare assumes that the former costs about 
30 Euro, and the latter about 500 Euro. Had she known at the time that 
the package contained an iPad, she would have turned it down, since she 
considers the value to be too high in relation to the work she has done 
for the student. A box of chocolate can be seen as a simple and symbolic 
gesture of gratitude, and Clare struggles to see the iPad in that light, due 
to the high price. Cost, then, appears to be a morally relevant feature, but 
is the difference between the assumed and the real price great enough to 
warrant either a process to locate the student and return the iPad, or to 
find another way to dispose of it?
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Clare faces a situation where she would be grateful for a concise demar-
cation between a gift and a bribe. Many transactions in organizational 
life occur in the grey zone between the white and innocent practice of 
exchanging gifts, and the grim blackness of pure bribery. Equipped with 
the principle of equality we can enter this grey zone with the intention 
of deciding where to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
transactions. Five aspects seem particularly relevant:
A. Intention: What does the giver want to achieve?
B. Roles: What are the particular roles and positions of the giver and 
receiver?
C. Timing: When does the transaction take place? Before or after a 
decision?
D. Value: What is the value of the object changing hands?
E.  Culture: Is it customary in this culture to offer gifts of this kind?
Clare can apply this list to her own situation, to clear her own mind for a 
decision on the matter:
A. Bribes are normally offered in order to gain an improper 
advantage. Clare is convinced that the student’s intention was to 
show gratitude, and not to affect future decisions on her part. It is 
unlikely that she will ever see or hear from him again.
B. Clare has been a supervisor to the student, and so has been in 
a higher ranking position than the giver. She has had power to 
affect the outcome of the grading, but that period ended when the 
student got the A grade, before she received the package.
C. Bribery occurs before a decision takes place, not after, unless the 
participants have agreed beforehand that a transaction will happen 
after the desired and agreed upon decision has been made. This 
does not hold in Clare’s case, since the package came as a genuine 
surprise, on the right side of the timeline. She would not have 
accepted it if the student had offered it to her before the grading, 
even if she had thought that it only contained chocolate.
D. The value of an iPad is high, and a decision-maker would normally 
have to reject it, since one could reasonably think that the reception 
of such an object would have the power to affect a decision, on a 
conscious or subconscious level. The receiver will normally feel 
that he or she owes the giver a considerable favour. An iPad creates 
indebtedness, but Clare can argue that she will probably never be in 
a position to repay the debt, and so should be free to accept it.
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E. The student comes from an area of the world where generous and 
valuable tokens of gratitude are accepted and expected. Turning 
them down can be interpreted as rude and impolite. On the other 
hand, such generous gifts are not part of the academic culture 
where Clare works, and it is not obvious which cultural norms 
should have the upper hand in the situation.
In sum, the analysis generated by the use of the principle of equality 
appears to support the conclusion that Clare can keep the iPad and 
consider it a pure and genuine gift rather than a calculated bribe. There 
may still be other arguments in favour of returning or giving up the iPad, 
but so far the reflections based on equality considerations give Clare 
moral reasons to hold on to it.
Another analytic test that flows from the principle of equality is one 
where the decision-maker can consider whether he or she would accept 
that his or her conduct became the norm for how to deal with situations 
of the same kind. Equal cases should be treated equally. If Clare thinks it 
is morally acceptable for her to keep the iPad, then presumably she must 
also believe that it morally acceptable for anybody else to do the same, 
under the same kind of circumstances. The fact that it is Clare and not 
Clarissa that faces this situation is normally not a relevant difference.
The principle of equality is similar to the Golden Rule, or the princi-
ple that one should treat others the way one would want them to treat 
oneself. An early version is attributed to the Greek philosopher Thales: 
“Avoid doing what you would blame others for doing.” The Golden Rule 
appears in many religions, philosophies, and cultures. It accentuates the 
idea that whether it is you or somebody else facing a particular deci-
sion situation, is from the outset morally irrelevant. It therefore follows 
that you should behave towards others in ways that you would want and 
accept that others to behave towards you.
Immanuel Kant’s consistency formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative appears similar to the Golden Rule, and is often interpreted 
as a version of it:
Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law. (Kant, 1998/1785, p. 422)
Kant thought that the Golden Rule lacked the universal and formal 
dimensions he sought to articulate in the Categorical Imperative. 
The Golden Rule is more of a hypothetical imperative, on his view. It 
encourages thinking of the kind that if you want people to be helpful 
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towards yourself, then you should be helpful towards them. Presumably, 
if helpfulness is not something you particularly treasure in others, you 
have no moral obligation to be helpful towards others. Kant meant the 
categorical imperative to be stricter than a hypothetical one in that it is 
universally binding for all rational beings, and not contingent upon indi-
vidual or cultural differences. It seems that he considered the Categorical 
Imperative to be an improvement on the Golden Rule in the sense that 
it avoided subjectivity and added universality as a requirement of moral 
considerations.
The principle of equality puts demands on the justification of choices. 
It requires that a decision-maker can back up a difference in treatment of 
two cases with an identification of a morally relevant difference between 
them, but does not single out one particular moral outlook or ethical 
foundation to be uniquely right. It does not favour duty ethics over 
utilitarianism, or vice versa, but remains neutral regarding the tension 
between them. As we saw in the discussion of the trolley problem, duty 
ethics considers the fact that a person is used as mere means to indicate 
that it is a morally unacceptable option, even though this option maxi-
mizes utility. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, considers consequences 
as the only morally relevant features of the situation, and thus comes to 
different conclusions about what to do. Both traditions acknowledge the 
principle of equality, but part company on the issue of what constitutes a 
morally relevant difference.
Looking back on previous examples from this book through the lens 
of the principle of equality, we can see how the justifications can take 
the form of finding reasons to make exceptions in the application of 
ordinary moral norms. In the blackmail case, Anne can claim that she 
does not give in to blackmail or other kinds of pressure that can occur 
in a corrupt economy, but that she makes an exception in this case, due 
to the colossal economic stakes that are involved. In the reference case, 
Ben can argue that he normally is truthful towards others, but that he is 
making an exception in this case, since he needs to restore harmony in 
his unit, and can do so effectively by hiding truths about the employee’s 
quarrelsome behaviour. In the second trolley case, a person can argue 
that he or she would normally not kill an innocent person, but that the 
current situation warrants an exception, since it is thereby possible to 
save five lives. Whether we accept these appeals to morally relevant 




Turning back to Clare and her decision regarding the iPad, she also 
has access to a second ethical principle, one we can call the principle of 
publicity. Formulated to fit an organization setting, we can express it as 
follows:
You should be willing to defend your decision publicly, and be open about it 
to relevant people, that is to your leaders, colleagues, customers, suppliers, 
other business relations, and other relevant stakeholders.
At the core of this principle is an appeal to transparency. Decisions 
should withstand the light of day. By sharing the decision and talking 
openly and publicly about it, the decision-maker is seeking some sort 
of endorsement from his or her peers, and from rational stakeholders. 
In Clare’s case, the relevant people would primarily be her academic 
colleagues and students. The responses from the latter group is particu-
larly interesting. How would they respond to the information that profes-
sor Clare received and accepted an iPad from a student she supervised 
to an A? Accountants are a profession drilled in the use of a distinction 
that is relevant here. They learn to consider both how things are “in 
reality” and “in appearance”. A client may actually have been in good 
faith when underreporting about an incident, but it might appear to the 
authorities that he has intentionally misled them. Both what we take to 
be the truth and how it may appear to others is relevant. In line with 
this way of thinking, Clare can be totally convinced that there is no link 
whatsoever between the good grade and the iPad, and can also have no 
doubts that the student’s intention was to show gratitude. Nevertheless, 
she also should consider how other people are likely to view the situa-
tion. If students start to connect the iPad and the A, it can create doubts 
about her integrity as a supervisor.
The principle of publicity addresses whether a decision will stand up 
to public scrutiny. The principle is a part of many versions in ethical 
guidelines in the professions, and in organizations’ codes of conduct. 
It is sometimes called the New York Times test: Never do anything you 
would not want to see reported on the front page of the New York Times, 
or whichever newspaper you consider important. One American lawyer 
I have worked with calls it “the smell test”: Does this particular action 
smell all right, or is there an unpleasant odour to it? I have heard an 
accountant refer to it as “the Aunt test”. His rule of thumb is to ask 
himself whether his aunt, a person he perceives to have formidable integ-
rity and wisdom, would have found his choice morally acceptable. One 
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of my colleagues operates with a “blush test” and considers whether the 
course of action he is contemplating would make him blush if it became 
common knowledge.
One objection to the principle of publicity is that in business and 
elsewhere in society decision-makers may face situations where 
all the alternatives open to them have negative consequences. Real 
moral dilemmas have no painless solutions, and some people will 
have legitimate reasons to complain, no matter what the decision has 
been. Hooker (2010) gives the example of a CEO of a large corporation 
who decides that the most responsible option in the tough economic 
situation is to lay off several thousand employees. The individual 
consequences are severe, and the CEO would not like to see the stories 
enfold on the front pages of newspapers and websites. Nevertheless, 
what he did might be the most morally sound option available to him 
under the circumstances.
This objection is primarily relevant in relation to a version of the 
principle of publicity interpreted as a newspaper or media test. It may 
be painful for the CEO to experience detailed media exposure of the 
personal sufferings of the people he has laid off. That in itself is not 
enough to say that his conduct demonstrates a failure to act in accord-
ance with the principle of publicity. It is likely that relevant stakeholders 
will understand his predicament and acknowledge the fact that no pain-
less and harmonious options were acceptable to him.
A second objection to the principle of publicity is that it conflicts with 
the idea of having company secrets, in the form of strategies and plans 
the competitors should not know about. This objection stems from a 
misunderstanding of the principle. It is not a plea for you to spread your 
company secrets with the wind. It allows you to keep sensitive business 
information to yourself, but challenges you to consider how your deci-
sions would look to the public eye. X out the names of the companies 
and persons involved, and contemplate what kind of response you 
would get from people close to you if you chose this or that option in a 
dilemma.
The principle of publicity invites reflection on the extent to which other 
rational agents would endorse our judgements and decisions. As such, it 
resembles the universality formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative:
Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to become a 
universal law of nature. (Kant, 1998, p. 422)
39Two Ethical Principles
DOI: 10.1057/9781137532619.0007
We can interpret this formulation to address the issue of transparency, 
and the extent to which your decision stands up to public scrutiny from 
other rational agents.
To sum up the practical contributions from normative ethics, utili-
tarianism offers one ethical principle, claiming that the decision-maker 
should strive to maximize utility for all concerned, and thus promote the 
common good. Duty ethics claims that there are limitations to what we 
should do in the name of promoting the common good, since we have 
a moral responsibility to respect other people and their human dignity. 
This ethical outlook comes to expression in the consistency, humanity, 
and universality formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. On a 
formal level, a utilitarian can actually accept the consistency and univer-
sality formulation, and say that he or she is consistently committed to 
the idea that one should maximize utility, even in a situation where that 
person would have to be sacrificed for the common good. The humanity 
formulation, however, is unacceptable to the utilitarian, and marks the 
point where the two ethical traditions are in fundamental disagreement.
The two ethical principles presented in this chapter offer a way to 
structure practical moral reasoning that oversteps the conflict between 
utilitarianism and duty ethics. We can apply the principles of equality 
and publicity to concrete cases without evoking the traditional tensions 
in ethical theory. That makes it possible to engage in ethical analysis of 
moral dilemmas without prior commitment to either of the two ethical 
theories.
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